This study investigates value preferences and structures among Japanese voters and political candidates. Voters were surveyed after the 2014 Lower House election, while political candidates were surveyed before the 2016 Upper House election. To measure their value preferences, respondents were asked to rank seven values: freedom, equality, economic stability, morality, self-reliance, social order, and patriotism. Statistical analyses reveal substantially different value priorities between voters and candidates. Furthermore, although little distinctiveness in value preferences was observed among Japanese voters, the tendency and cohesion of value preferences among candidates varied across parties. More specifically, the four opposition parties that collaborated in the 2016 election and the Clean Government Party had similar value preferences, while the least cohesive party in terms of value preferences was the Liberal Democratic Party.

Keywords: value preference, value structure, congruence, ranking data, Japanese politics

Hirofumi Miwa is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies in the Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University. His research interests lie in the areas of public opinion and voting behavior. His work has been published in journals such as the Journal of Politics, Public Opinion Quarterly, and International Political Science Review.
This study investigates value preferences and structures among Japanese voters and political candidates using survey data. Two comparisons were conducted to enable deeper understanding and evaluation of contemporary Japanese politics. First, the value preferences of voters and candidates were compared. Whereas many scholars have examined policy or ideological congruence, which indicates the extent to which the policy or ideological preferences of the political elite match those of the electorate, this study investigated “value congruence” in Japan. Second, among voters and candidates respectively, value preferences were compared with regard to party preferences or affiliation.

This study adopted Jacoby’s (2014a, 755) definition of values in understanding and measuring value preferences, namely that values involve “each person’s abstract conceptions about the desirable and undesirable end-states of human life.” Values are distinguished from attitudes by the degree of abstraction; as Halman (2007, 309) summarizes, there is “a more or less hierarchical structure in which values are more basic than attitudes.” Many previous studies, both in Japan and elsewhere, have examined the extent to which the policy attitudes and ideological positions of political representatives accord with those of the relevant electorates, and the intensity of policy and ideological conflicts between parties. However, a study of value preferences has important implications not usually considered in studies of policy attitudes and ideology.

Regarding the analysis of value congruence, when considering political means and ends, values focus on ends while policy concerns the means to realize “desirable end-states of human life” (Jacoby 2014a, 755). Therefore, the degree of representation in a democracy should be assessed through measuring value congruence, rather than policy or ideological congruence (Marietta 2010). Even when voters elect politicians whose policy platforms well match their policy preferences, the unexpected emergence of novel issues not present in their original platforms will likely lead politicians to respond based on their fundamental value orientations. This

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Japanese Political Science Association (Ibaraki, Osaka, October 2, 2016). The author is grateful to Masaki Taniguchi for cooperation in measuring value preferences of voters and candidates in his surveys. The author also thanks Yukio Maeda, Shiro Sakaiya, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI Grant Number 16H07164 and the Sakuradakai Foundation.

1. The appendix for this study is available on the journal’s website. Replication files are available from the Harvard Dataverse (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PVQVWD).
might result in undesirable outcomes for voters. Such considerations suggest that, to understand political behavior, values should be studied as well as policies and ideology.

Moreover, a party-based comparison of value preferences is required to better understand the nature of political conflict in contemporary Japan. Although previous research has identified party-based ideological conflict, the ideological labels per se do not reveal the fundamental nature of such conflict. Ideologically constrained issue positions are not necessarily logically associated: for example, in the U.S., “there is no apparent reason why opposition to legal abortion should go together with support for lower taxes as part of the contemporary ‘conservative’ belief package” (Federico 2011, 89). Therefore, to understand the foundations of political party conflict, it may be necessary to examine more abstract values, rather than policy-related and ideological attitudes.

This article is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous literature on political value preferences, especially in Japan, and locates this study within the context of this literature. The third section describes the data and how value preferences were measured. The fourth section then compares voters and candidates in terms of their value preferences and value structures. In the fifth and sixth sections, party-based comparisons are conducted for voters and candidates, respectively. The final section summarizes the implications of the study’s findings.

Previous Literature and this Study’s Contributions

Values are believed to be the basis of societies. While some studies have sought to explain cultural differences in the predominant values between societies or chronological transitions in values (see, for example, Inglehart [1990] on materialist/post-materialist values), other research has tried to use values to explain individual differences in political attitudes or partisan conflict within a society. Previous studies, mainly in the United States, have shown that core political values—such as equality, individualism, morality, and social order—underlie partisan conflict (e.g., Jacoby 2014a), and affect individual policy preferences (e.g., Feldman 1988; Goren 2004; Jacoby 2006).

In Japan, some researchers have discussed political values, but most focus on how Japanese value orientation has changed with modernization.

2. Recent research has claimed that basic personal values related to all domains of individual life underlie political values (Schwartz et al. 2010); however, this study focuses only on political values.
and post-materialization. It is well known that Watanuki (1967) attributed political conflict in Japan to the cleavage of traditional versus modern values, rather than economic interests. Although his argument was not based on individual value preferences data, Maeda (1988) and Watanuki (1997) later found some evidence of a relation between traditional-modern value orientation and both ideological and partisan orientation at the individual level. In addition, Inglehart’s theory of materialist/post-materialist values has drawn scholarly attention in Japan. In aggregate comparisons, there was a general trend of post-materialist values growing in importance (Inglehart 1990; Watanuki 1997), though cross-national comparison revealed that the proportion of pure post-materialists was lower in Japan than in Western industrial countries (Inglehart 1990; Kōhei 1979; 1983). In individual-level analyses, while Kōhei (1979) found no relation between materialist/post-materialist value conflict and ideological conflict, Okano and Kitani (1988) and Watanuki (1986) found a modest relationship between post-industrial values, which are distinguished from traditional/industrial values, and ideological orientation.

In contrast, little is known about the value preferences of the political elite. One of the few notable contributions is Verba et al. (1987), whose research investigated egalitarian values among the political elite. They included in this category not only politicians but also bureaucrats, the leaders of various interest groups, and reporters, editors, and managers in news media; they compared findings for Japan, Sweden, and the United States. Miyake et al. (1985), who conducted elaborate studies of the Japanese elite, showed that elite groups who self-identify as progressive are likely to think the status quo should be changed and prefer more equality, while self-identifying conservatives’ views are the opposite. They also identified several sub-components of equality among the elite (e.g., values related to gender and foreigners).

Building on the above literature, this research expands the study of political values in Japan in the following respects. First, it focuses on broader value preferences compared to previous research in Japan. Research on Japanese voters’ value preferences has mostly relied on Watanuki’s cultural politics contention and Inglehart’s theory on post-materialist values.

3. Kojima (1979) posits a value dimension called instrumental-consummatory (majime-asobi) orientations, which are distinguished from traditional/anti-traditional orientations. However, Kōhei (1983) points out that instrumental-consummatory values overlap with materialist/post-materialist values.

4. Tarōmaru (2016) also provides some evidence that postwar Japanese values have transformed from survival-oriented to self-expression oriented, as an extended dimension of materialist/post-materialist values.
Regarding the value preferences of the political elite, the focus of Verba et al. (1987) and Miyake et al. (1985) was limited to egalitarian values. By contrast, this study measures the relative importance of seven values—freedom, equality, economic stability, morality, self-reliance, social order, and patriotism—among individual voters and political candidates, revealing that they are organized in a multidimensional structure not necessarily corresponding with traditional-modern, materialist/post-materialist, or status quo-equality cleavages. This study thus expands the scope of research on values in Japan, though its results will also be located in the debate on post-materialism in the concluding section.

Second, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to examine value congruence between voters and the elite using comparable survey data on their value preferences. Although Verba et al. (1987) and Miyake et al. (1985) studied the value preferences of the political elite, they did not intensively survey politicians, and the response rate for the survey investigated by both studies was fairly low (13.2% for Japanese national representatives). Moreover, their surveys were not directly comparable to any voter surveys. By contrast, the survey data used in this study (see the next section) allows comparison of the value preferences among and between Japanese voters and political candidates, based on a high response rate.

Data

This study measured the value preferences of Japanese voters and political party candidates using the same ranking format questions employed by Jacoby (2014a). The UTokyo-Asahi Voter Survey (UTAVS) was used to examine the value preferences of Japanese voters. The UTAVS posed the following question to respondents:

5. Tiberj and Kerrouche (2013) claim to have investigated the quality of representation in France in terms of values. However, some of their survey items (e.g., “There are too many civil servants” and “The Lisbon Treaty is a good text”) are too policy-specific; thus, they arguably measured issue attitudes, rather than value preferences.

6. Some scholars have expressed concern that a ranking format inappropriately compels respondents to rank values that they may believe to be equally important. However, Jacoby (2006) and Ciuk and Jacoby (2015), employing a similar ordering of value preferences, showed that most American voters would express transitive preferences for multiple values. It is not unreasonable to consider that this also holds for Japanese voters.

7. This question was originally designed to compare the value preferences of Japanese voters and U.S. voters, as examined in Jacoby (2014a). As this comparison falls outside the scope of this study, it is not reported here. However, readers interested in this topic are referred to the results of the Japan-U.S. comparison in Appendix F.
Although the seven values listed below are thought to be important by many people, we sometimes have to choose one value over another. If you had to rank these values, which order would you choose? Please record the numbers in parentheses according to order of priority, from 1 (most important) to 7 (least important). Do not give the same rank for different values: please assign a unique number for each value.

In addition, to examine the value preferences of political party candidates in Japan, the UTokyo-Asahi Elite Survey (UTAES) was used. The UTAES contained the following question:

Although the seven values listed below are thought to be important by many people, if you had to rank these values, which order would you choose? Please write down the numbers in parentheses according to order of priority, from 1 (most important) to 7. Do not give the same rank for different values: please assign a unique number for each value. (Note: please consider the value definitions in brackets for potentially equivocal concepts.)

The UTAES was conducted via mail from December 15, 2014, to January 31, 2015. Respondents were sampled using a two-stage stratified random sampling of eligible voters. Of 3,000 people surveyed, 1,813 answered (a 60.4% response rate). The UTAES was administered to candidates prior to the 2016 House of Councillors (HoC: the Japanese Upper House) election. Of 389 candidates, 373 answered (a 95.9% response rate).

Panel A of Table 1 shows a Romanized list of the seven values from the two surveys, hereinafter referred to as the UTASs. The definitions accompanying the value labels aimed to prevent value interpretations varying between individual respondents. Panel B of Table 1 shows the English version. What should be noted here is that “equality” indicates equality of opportunity, while “economic stability” indicates equality of outcome.

Because the UTASs were conducted using paper-based questionnaires, inappropriate answers could not be prevented, such as tied ranking, non-sequential ranking, or a partial ranking. In the following sections, unless

8. The data and codebook of the UTASs are available on the project website (http://www.masaki.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/utas/utasindex.html).
9. As the Japanese Upper House is a staggered-term chamber, half the members are elected in each election. Although the UTAES included members who were not up for reelection that year, their questionnaire did not contain the question on value preferences. Therefore, this study does not include data from these members.
10. The English version of the value labels and their definitions was produced through back-translation by a third person.
11. Another potential concern regarding the paper-based questionnaires is that the order of values (as shown in Table 1) was not randomized across respondents. Therefore,
otherwise specified, only the value preferences of those who completely ranked the seven values have been used. The number of these responses due to the primacy effect, respondents would have been more likely to rank highly freedom and equality and to rank social order and patriotism lower: 23 UTAVS respondents (1.5% of those who gave a complete ranking) and 13 UTAES respondents (4.2%) ranked the seven values in the same order as they were listed in the questionnaire (i.e., 1 for freedom, 2 for equality, and so on). However, in an online survey of Japanese voters conducted by the author in November 2017, using nearly the same question on value preferences but with a randomized order of values, the average ranks of freedom, equality, social order, and patriotism did not substantially change. Therefore, the primacy effect can be essentially disregarded in interpreting the results. Details of the online survey are shown in Appendix F.
comprised 1,543 from Japanese voters and 308 from Japanese candidates (of whom 84 subsequently won their seat).\footnote{12}

**Comparison between Japanese Voters and Political Candidates**

**AVERAGE RANKING OF VALUES**

Figure 1 summarizes the average value preferences of Japanese voters and HoC election candidates.\footnote{13} The horizontal axis indicates the average rank-

\footnote{12} The number of respondents who gave a partial ranking or did not rank any values was 215 (11.9\%) for the UTAVS and 76 (19.5\%) for the UTAES. The number of respondents who ranked all seven values but gave a tied or non-sequential ranking was 55 (3.0\%) for the UTAVS and five (1.3\%) for the UTAES. Patterns of missing responses by party in the UTAES are shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.

\footnote{13} R version 3.4.3 (R Core Team 2017) is used throughout this article.
The top-left panel shows the value preferences of Japanese voters. They assigned the highest priority to economic stability, followed by social order. The next highest values were freedom and equality, but these involved differing characteristics: while equality was identified as at least moderately important by many people, prioritization of freedom was polarized: 18.8% of Japanese voters considered freedom the most important value, 11.9% assigned it the least importance (the corresponding values for equality were 9.9% and 4.8%, respectively). The least prioritized value among Japanese voters was patriotism, placed in the lowest position by 52.6% of respondents. This was much higher than the corresponding value for the second-least prioritized value, self-reliance, at 20.3%.

The bottom-left panel shows that HoC election candidates overwhelmingly prioritized freedom, marking a distinctive difference between Japanese voters and their political candidates. Second came equality, followed closely by economic stability and social order. When only election winners’ responses were examined, as shown in the bottom-right panel, the average rank of equality became higher, the proportion of candidates who thought equality was most important increased, and the gap between freedom and equality shrank. However, the relative importance of all values changed little, indicating that value preference differences between Japanese voters and candidates were not an artifact of losing candidate preferences.

VALUE STRUCTURES

Like Jacoby (2014a), this study employed multidimensional preference analysis (MDPREF) to illustrate the value structures of each group. MDPREF is a method involving the dimensionality reduction of the ranking data. This method sets points that represent judges—which allows the construction of judge vectors—and points that represent ranked items in d-dimensional space, where d is a natural number smaller than the number of items. If the MDPREF solution fits the data well, the perpendicular

14. More details concerning the distribution of value ranks are shown in Figure A1 in Appendix B.
15. Whether value incongruence between voters and candidates is attributable to social desirability bias in the UTAES may be queried, since respondents are aware that its data are published non-anonymously. However, “socially desirable” answers for election candidates should be as congruent with voter preferences as possible. Therefore, even if non-anonymity does cause social desirability bias, it should not induce an underestimation of value congruence.
projection of all ranked items’ points onto a judge vector will closely approximate the rank order given by that judge (Alvo and Yu 2014).

To illustrate, consider the case in which only three values are ranked, as depicted in Figure 2. If two-dimensional space is assumed, the three values are located at each white dot, and respondent A is located at the black dot labeled A, then A’s value ranking is approximated as freedom, social order, and patriotism. This interpretation is derived by taking the foot of the perpendiculars from the points of values to line AO, and ordering these points from least to most distant from point A. Similarly, it is possible to approximate the value ranking order for respondent B, located at the black dot labeled B, as social order, patriotism, and freedom.

Following Jacoby (2014a), the MDPREF model was estimated using alternating least squares optimal scaling (ALSOS), which assumes only monotonicity, and not linearity, of ranking data.16 A two-dimensional

16. Jacoby (2014b) was referenced, which contains a replication code of Jacoby (2014a), to implement the ALSOS algorithm. For details of the ALSOS, see the supplemental report of Jacoby (2014a).
model was adopted for all groups as this provides sufficient explanatory power, which is little enhanced by increasing the number of dimensions.¹⁷

Figure 3 shows the estimation results of the MDPREF model for Japanese voters (top-left panel), HoC election candidates (bottom-left panel), and election winners (bottom-right panel). Individual respondents were arrayed around the unit circles because interpretation does not change if the direction of a vector from the origin to an individual point remains constant.¹⁸ Points on circles indicate the location of individual respondents; in the top-left panel, 300 randomly sampled respondents are displayed for visibility.

¹⁷ On applying MDPREF to the UTAVS data, the R-squared values were 0.561, 0.854, and 0.896 for one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and three-dimensional models, respectively. The corresponding values were 0.669, 0.911, and 0.945 for the UTAES data.

¹⁸ The *circular* package version 0.4–93 (Agostinelli and Lund 2017) was used to deal with circular data.
White dots represent the location of values, while the curved shape enclosing each circle shows the estimated density of value preferences. Arrows indicate mean direction vectors, showing the average value preferences in each group. These arrows also indicate the extent of heterogeneity of the value preferences: the shorter the arrow, the more heterogeneous the value preferences (Jacoby 2014a). Rotating two-dimensional space does not affect the interpretation of results; therefore, for ease of comparison, spaces have been rotated such that an x-coordinate of freedom equals zero, a y-coordinate of freedom becomes positive, and an x-coordinate of equality becomes negative. The bottom-right panel shows the application of MDPREF to data of the 2016 HoC election candidates, including losers (thus, the locations of values are the same as those in the bottom-left panel).

The arrow in the top-left panel shows that the average value rank ordering for Japanese voters was economic stability, social order, equality, freedom, morality, self-reliance, and patriotism, which corresponds to the average rankings and the proportion who chose each as their most important value, as shown in Figure 1. According to value locations, it is possible to interpret the 11–12 o’clock segment as representing liberal value preferences, and the 3–7 o’clock segment as representing conservative value preferences. Complementing the finding of previous works that the distribution of Japanese voters’ ideology is center-peaked (e.g., Kabashima and Takenaka 2012), Figure 3 shows that the distribution of Japanese voters’ value preferences is also center-peaked: the mean and mode of individual locations lie in the 9–10 o’clock segment, which is between liberal and conservative value preferences.

In the bottom-left panel, 2016 HoC election candidates cluster in the 9–12 o’clock segment, which represents value preferences prioritizing freedom, equality, and economic stability. Although the heterogeneity in value preferences, which is indicated by the length of arrows, was a little greater for the candidates than for Japanese voters, there was less dispersion near the mode for candidates than for voters. When observations are restricted to election winners, as seen in the bottom-right panel, the tendency to prioritize freedom, equality, and economic stability becomes more prominent.

Comparing the top-left and bottom-left panels shows that, although the distribution of value preferences differs between Japanese voters and political candidates, these two groups have similar value structures. Apart from slight differences in the locations of economic stability and social order, the overall value locations do not differ between the two groups. This result indicates that, in terms of value preference organization (i.e.,
which values are likely to be closely associated or opposed), Japanese voters and political candidates were very similar.

Party-Based Comparison Among Japanese Voters

ANALYSES OF OVERALL VALUE PREFERENCES

This section explores how Japanese voters’ value preferences vary according to party support. The UTAVS respondents were categorized by their political party preferences, and individual value preferences were then examined, as estimated by the MDPREF used in the previous section. Political party preferences were measured through a question concerning long-term partisanship, as proposed by Taniguchi (2012), the English translation of which reads: “Many people seem to think that ‘I’m close to the *** party.’ Allowing for the fact that you may vote for other parties in the short term, what party are you closest to in the long run?” Respondents indicating a preference for any of the following eight political parties were included in the analysis: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the Clean Government Party (CGP, a.k.a. Kōmeitō), the Party for Future Generations (PFG), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the People’s Life Party (PLP), and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Also included were independent voters.

The results are presented in Figure 4, which should be interpreted in the same way as Figure 3. On average, it appears that Japanese citizens, including independent voters, had similar value preferences irrespective of their long-term partisanship. The arrows representing average value rankings indicate that the average value priority was the same for supporters of the four major parties at that time: the LDP, DPJ, JIP, and CGP. Although the arrows for the JCP and SDP supporters and independent voters imply that they prioritize freedom and equality more than do LDP and DPJ supporters, it still appears that all five groups have very similar value preferences. The conservative value preferences of those with long-term PFG partisanship (the arrow indicates that they prioritize social order, patriotism, and morality) seemed initially noteworthy, but it was not possible to draw clear conclusions for PFG supporters because the number of observations was too small and the heterogeneity in value preferences too high.

Analyses of the Rank Order of Individual Values

Previous analyses of Japanese voters have implied that different parties’ supporters exhibit little difference in their overall value preferences.
However, by focusing on the prioritization of individual values in this study, distinctive political party allegiance patterns might be identified. To more precisely detect any relation between political party preferences and value preferences, this study examined whether the rank order of individual values differed between supporters of the three major parties at that time: the LDP, DPJ, and JIP.
A model was constructed to estimate whether an individual’s rank order of values can be explained by their long-term partisanship. The outcome variable was the rank order of values. Since the statistical method used allows for incomplete ranking and ties, the data of 1,639 respondents who provided rank orders for at least two values were used.

The explanatory variables are long-term partisanship. Three dummy variables for LDP, DPJ, and JIP partisanship were created, using individuals with allegiances to other political parties, independent voters, and those who did not indicate their long-term partisanship as a reference category. Because the reference category is a miscellany, it is not possible to directly account for the influence of these dummy variables on outcomes. However, such specification is sufficient to compare LDP, DPJ, and JIP partisans using post-estimation simulation techniques.

This study employed the multivariate normal order statistics (MVNOS) model to analyze ranking data. The parameters of the MVNOS model were estimated using Bayesian methods, and post-estimation simulation was conducted to interpret the estimation results.

Figure 5 shows the simulation results. The top-left panel illustrates the average change in the rank of each value when changing long-term partisanship from the LDP to the DPJ. The top-right and bottom-left panels show simulation results on changes in long-term partisanship from the LDP to the JIP, and from the DPJ to the JIP, respectively. It should be noted that a negative change in a value’s rank implies that it has come to be considered more important. Dots represent the point estimates, and segments represent the 95% credible intervals (CIs).

19. It may be suspected that an individual’s value preferences causally precede political party preferences, and that long-term partisanship, instead of a rank order of values, should be treated as the outcome variable. However, it is difficult to specify the direction of causality using ordinary survey data because some political party supporters form their value preferences in accordance with their preferred party’s principles. This analysis aimed to test bivariate relationships between long-term partisanship and value preferences. For this purpose, value preferences (ranking data) are easier to model effectively than long-term partisanship (requiring data to be chosen for many alternatives).

20. For any inconsistent ties and subsequent values, such values were corrected before the analysis: for example, if a rank order was (1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 5), this was corrected to (1, 2, 2, 5, 6, 7).

21. The results did not substantially change when some demographic variables were added as explanatory variables. Details are shown in Appendix D.

22. Detailed explanations of the MVNOS model and the estimation and simulation procedures are provided in Appendix C.

23. A posterior mean was employed as a point estimate and the highest posterior density interval as a CI.
previous section, value ranking was not strongly associated with long-term partisanship.

However, some interesting differences in individual value preferences were identified between the three parties. When comparing LDP and DPJ supporters, the former was likely to prioritize patriotism, while the latter was likely to prioritize equality. DPJ supporters also assigned higher priority to equality than did JIP supporters. In addition, though the difference was small, JIP supporters were more likely to rank self-reliance higher compared to supporters of the other two parties.24 Thus, although the overall value preferences of Japanese citizens seemed to vary little irrespective of political party preferences, a separate investigation of the value rankings revealed that some values were characteristic of each party’s supporters.

24. The 90% credible interval of the average change in the rank of self-reliance does not include zero for comparisons between the DPJ and JIP.
Table 2. Parties analyzed in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>English Name</th>
<th>Japanese Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>Clean Government Party</td>
<td>Kōmeitō</td>
<td>Merged with part of the JIP to become the DP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
<td>Minshutō</td>
<td>Merger of the DPJ and part of the JIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Minshintō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>Happiness Realization Party</td>
<td>Kōfuku Jitsugentō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IfO</td>
<td>Initiatives from Osaka</td>
<td>Osaka Ishin no Kai</td>
<td>Formed from a split in the JIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japanese Communist Party</td>
<td>Nihon Kyōsantō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIP</td>
<td>Japan Innovation Party</td>
<td>Nippon Ishin no Kai</td>
<td>Split into the DP and IfO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
<td>Jiyū Minshutō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFG</td>
<td>Party for Future Generations</td>
<td>Jisedai no Tō</td>
<td>Renamed the PJK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJK</td>
<td>Party for Japanese Kokoro</td>
<td>Nippon no Kokoro o Taisetsu ni Suru Tō</td>
<td>Formerly known as the PFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLP</td>
<td>People’s Life Party</td>
<td>Seikatsu no Tō</td>
<td>Renamed the PLP&amp;TYF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLP&amp;TYF</td>
<td>People’s Life Party &amp; Tarō Yamamoto and Friends</td>
<td>Seikatsu no Tō to Yamamoto Tarō to Nakamatachi</td>
<td>Formerly known as the PLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Shakai Minshutō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party-Based Comparison Among Japanese Political Candidates

This section compares the value preferences for UTAES respondents affiliated to different parties. The parties analyzed comprised the LDP, the Democratic Party (DP), Initiatives from Osaka (IFO), the CGP, the Party for Japanese Kokoro (PJK), the JCP, the People’s Life Party & Tarō Yamamoto and Friends (PLP&TYF), the SDP, and the Happiness
Realization Party (HRP). Additionally, joint candidates of opposition parties, that is, independent candidates supported by the DP, JCP, PLP&TYF, and SDP, were examined. In the intervening period between the UTAVS (conducted in 2014–2015) and the UTAES (2016), some parties split, merged, or changed their names. Details of how the old and new parties are related are summarized in Table 2.

The results of this comparison are shown in Figure 6. The candidates nominated by the DP, JCP, PLP&TYF, and SDP, as opposition parties that collaborated in the 2016 HoC election, had almost the same value preferences. The same analysis was conducted limited to the election winners, and no substantive differences were found. The results are shown in Figure A3 in Appendix E.

25. The same analysis was conducted limited to the election winners, and no substantive differences were found. The results are shown in Figure A3 in Appendix E.
ferences on average. Long arrows indicate that the value preferences were highly cohesive within each of these parties, as was the case for their joint candidates. Some government party members and the conservative media criticized these parties’ electoral collaboration, arguing that divergences in policy positions within several important fields, such as constitutional revision, security policy, and nuclear power plants, made the coalition unprincipled. 26 However, Figure 6 demonstrates that the four opposition parties were aligned on the more fundamental value preferences, despite diverging on certain issues. The distribution of the value preferences of CGP candidates, whose party has been involved as a junior coalition partner of the LDP since 1999, was very similar to those for candidates of the four opposition parties. Most party candidates are located within a 90-degree range, which means there were virtually no combinations of individuals with opposing value preferences within these parties. Furthermore, comparison with Figure 4 indicates that the candidates and their parties’ supporters had relatively similar average value preferences.

Another noteworthy finding in this part of the study was the highly dispersed value preferences of the LDP candidates. Although their average value preferences were similar to those of the four opposition parties and the CGP, several LDP candidates exhibited conservative value preferences in the 4–7 o’clock segment. Some combinations of individual LDP candidates had diametrically opposed value preferences to other LDP candidates. Compared to other parties, the LDP was the least cohesive in terms of value orientations. This conclusion contrasts with prior research findings on the policy positions of Japanese political parties, which reported greater cohesiveness in ideological positions and/or positions on defense and security issues in the LDP than in the DPJ (Catalinac 2018; Taniguchi 2006; 2015).

Finally, the results for the remaining parties can be briefly outlined as follows. Most IfO candidates are located on the top of the circle, which indicates that they clearly prioritized freedom and attach little importance to economic stability. This reflects the IfO’s neo-liberal stance and was a distinctive feature compared to the DP and the other liberal opposition parties. The average value preferences of the PJK and HRP, considered as extreme right parties, were also quite distinctive: their candidates’ priorities were patriotism, self-reliance, and freedom. Conversely, several PJK and HRP candidates, located in the 4–7 o’clock segment, gave a low rank to

26. For example, see the Yomiuri Shimbun’s editorial on July 4, 2016.
freedom. These results indicate intra-party variation in prioritizing freedom within Japan’s extreme right parties.

Concluding Remarks

This study used voter survey data to investigate value preferences among Japanese voters and the connections between these preferences and support for different political parties. In addition, it utilized the same approach to explore candidate value preferences using elite survey data. It then compared the value preference results for Japanese voters and candidates, seeking to identify their respective value structures.

This study’s first conclusion is that elite-mass congruence on value preferences is not high in Japan. While Japanese voters highly prioritized economic stability and social order, Japanese political candidates tended to prioritize freedom and equality. Examining value congruence between parties and their supporters yields the same conclusion. In particular, several HoC candidates of the LDP—the governing party and well supported at the time of this study—attach importance to morality and patriotism, neither of which is considered important by most LDP supporters. Previous studies have found low ideological congruence between voters and the Diet members in recent Japanese politics (Katsumata 2016; Taniguchi 2015).27 This study reached the same conclusion as regards more fundamental values. Conversely, this study found that Japanese voters and candidates have similar value structures.

The study’s second conclusion is that there is no partisan conflict on value preferences among Japanese voters, whereas prominent differences exist between the value preferences of different Japanese parties’ political candidates. Voter tendency to prioritize economic stability and social order did not depend on political party preference. However, when values were examined individually, some minor differences emerged between different parties’ supporters: among supporters of the LDP, DPJ, and JIP, the first favored patriotism more than the other two, the second favored equality more than the other two, and the third favored self-reliance more than the other two. In contrast to voters, the direction and cohesion of value preferences among candidates varied across parties. One noteworthy finding is that the four opposition parties that collaborated in the 2016 HoC election had similar value preferences, while the CGP was more

27. See also Horiuchi et al. (2018), who showed a lack of accord between the policy preferences of the electorate during a national election period and the manifesto of the LDP, which ultimately won the election.
closely aligned in its value preferences to these opposition parties than to its coalition partner, the LDP. It was also striking that the cohesion of value preferences among LDP politicians was very low.

From the perspective of materialist versus post-materialist values, economic stability and social order can be seen as materialist, while freedom and equality can be seen as post-materialist. Therefore, the study’s findings indicate that Japanese voters favor materialist values much more than post-materialist values, while the opposite is true of Japanese political candidates. There is evidently remarkable value incongruence between Japanese voters and candidates as regards the materialist/post-materialist perspective. The materialist tendency observed among Japanese voters is consistent with Ikeda (2016), who shows that Japanese have come to lean toward materialist values since the first decade of the twenty-first century.

This study has important implications for analyzing political parties in Japan. It raises the question of why party cohesion on issue preferences and on value preferences differs between the LDP and DP. It is well known that the DP (or DPJ) has been less cohesive on some issues, such as constitutional reform, security, and nuclear power plants compared to the LDP. However, this study’s analysis showed high cohesiveness in value preferences among DP candidates, whereas the LDP was the least cohesive on value preferences among the major parties at the time of the 2016 HoC election. One possible explanation for this value cohesion difference may be the extent of each party’s resources for maintaining unity. The LDP has achieved long-term, one-party dominance in Japanese politics, and was expected to extend its dominant position at the 2016 election. Consequently, the party’s Diet members have been in positions to access resources for rent-seeking and target funding for political gain. They may, therefore, be less concerned about value dissension and more inclined to accept party discipline, resulting in relatively high policy cohesion. In contrast, the DP cannot use resources provided by the state to maintain its unity (Uekami and Tsutsumi 2011), and must therefore rely on its values to attract potential political support. However, policy dissension is likely to be revealed at the time when specific policies (means) must be employed to realize the party’s values (ends). Although these observations are conjectural, this study’s findings suggest that researchers of political party organization and governance should focus on not only policy or ideological cohesion but also cohesion in value preferences.

Finally, one caveat should be noted on generalizing the results on the value preferences of the Japanese political elite. This study focused on HoC candidates but not the candidates of the House of Representatives.
(HoR: the Japanese Lower House), which has greater power than the HoC. While the majority of HoR members are elected in single-member districts (SMDs), most HoC members are not. HoC candidates under open-list proportional representation are considered to be supported by specific interest groups, to whose views they are particularly sensitive. Therefore, this study might underrate mass-elite value congruence in Japan, and HoR candidates in SMDs might be more responsive to voter value preferences. 28 It is, therefore, desirable for future research to investigate the value preferences of HoR candidates and members.

References

Agostinelli, Claudio, and Ulric Lund

Alvo, Mayer, and Philip L. H. Yu

Catalinac, Amy

Ciuk, David J., and William G. Jacoby

Federico, Christopher M.

Feldman, Stanley

Goren, Paul

Halman, Loek

28. The author’s further analysis of the UTAES showed that, among the HoC election candidates, those running in SMDs were more congruent with the electorate in their value preferences compared to those under open-list proportional representation (Miwa 2016).


Kojima Kazuto 1979 “Ishiki henka no hōkō to tokushitsu” (Direction and Characteristics of Consciousness Change). In Gendai Nihonjin no ishiki kōzō (Con-
Maeda Kazutaka  

Marietta, Morgan  

Miwa Hirofumi  

Miyake Ichirō, Jōji Watanuki, Kiyoshi Shima, and Ikuo Kabashima  

Okano Kaoru and Ichimatsu Kitani  

R Core Team  

Schwartz, Shalom H., Gian Vittorio Caprara, and Michele Vecchione  

Taniguchi Masaki  


Taniguchi Masaki and Hirofumi Miwa

Tarōmaru Hiroshi, ed.

Tiberj, Vincent, and Eric Kerrouche

Uekami Takayoshi and Hidenori Tsutsumi

Verba, Sidney, et al.

Watanuki, Jōji
1997 “Shusshō kōhōto to dentōteki kachi” (Birth Cohort and Traditional Values). In Kankyō hendō to seiji henyō (Environmental Change and Attitude Change), Jōji Watanuki and Ichirō Miyake, 3–29. Tokyo: Bokutakusha.